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Case No. 20040638-SC 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF, POINT II 
THE STATUTORY JURISDICTIONAL TIME LIMIT FOR 
WITHDRAWING A GUILTY PLEA CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED 
BY EITHER THE MISPLEA DOCTRINE OR EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
PRESERVATION RULE 
Defendant's supplemental brief acknowledges, at least implicitly, that this Court lacks 
statutory jurisdiction to entertain the validity of a guilty plea where, as here, the defendant 
does not file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See Supp. Br. Aplt. 24. Defendant 
nevertheless seeks review of the validity of his plea by invoking the "misplea doctrine" and 
resorting to exceptions to the preservation rule. Id. at 23-29. Neither basis can confer 
jurisdiction on this Court where none exists. 
A. The misplea doctrine does not apply to what would otherwise be the subject of 
a motion to withdraw a plea. 
Defendant argues that this Court "has the authority to nullify guilty pleas under the 
misplea doctrine .. . provided that the misplea order was manifestly necessary." Supp. Br. 
Aplt. 23-24. He then asserts that the "power to declare a misplea is not limited by the 
jurisdictional nature of Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6." Id. at 24. 
It is true that a trial court may, under narrow circumstances, declare a misplea, see 
State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294,1304-05 (Utah 1986), and that it may do so after announcement 
of sentence, the statutory deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a plea. See State v. Lopez, 
2005 UT App 496,128 P.3d 1. But once a plea is final—i.e., sentence has been entered—it 
cannot be undone by declaration of a misplea. See Kay, 111 P.2d at 1303; State v. Casey, 
2002 UT 29,146,44 P.3d 756 (Wilkins, J., concurring); Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, \ 20,25. 
Thus, as a threshold matter, it is too late for this Court to declare a misplea. 
In any event, the misplea doctrine does not apply where, as here, the challenge to the 
plea would ordinarily be the subject of a motion to withdraw the plea. In Utah, a trial court 
may declare a misplea—that is, rescind its acceptance of a guilty plea and set the matter for 
trial—without offending double jeopardy so long as there is a showing of "manifest 
necessity" and "no undue prejudice to the defendant." Kay, 111 P.2d at 1305. In other 
words, once a plea has been accepted by the trial court, it may be set aside over the objection 
of the defendant only when there is a manifest necessity for doing so. Id. at 1304-05. If a 
trial court rescinds the plea agreement without a manifest necessity, double jeopardy bars 
trying the defendant. Id. The misplea doctrine was developed "to protect the legitimate 
interests of a defendant against capricious action by the court or the prosecution in refusing 
to abide by plea agreements." Id. at 1304. 
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The misplea doctrine, then, applies when a plea has been accepted and when a trial 
court—either on its own motion or at the behest of the prosecution—rescinds the plea 
agreement over the objection of the defendant. See, e.g., Kay, 111 P.2d at 1296-97,1302-06 
(trial court rescinded unilateral plea at request of prosecution and over objection of 
defendant); State v. Bemert, 2004 UT App 321, ffif 2-5, 7-12, 100 P.3d 221 (trial court 
rescinded acceptance of plea at prosecution's request and over defendant's objection so that 
case could be transferred to county for prosecution of greater charge); State v. Horrocks, 
2001 UTApp4,t1J2-7,12-32,17P.3d 1145 Gustice court rescinded defendant's guilty pleas 
over his objection so that greater charges could be brought in district court); State v. Moss, 
921 P.2d 1021, 1022-27 (Utah App. 1996) (trial court sua sponte declared misplea upon 
discovering defendant's guilty plea in abeyance violated statute). Cf. Casey, 2002 UT 29, 
ffif 11,16,40 n. 14 (victim unsuccessfully sought misplea based on violation of victim's right 
to be heard at change-of-plea hearing); Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, ^f 2-8, 14-27 (trial court 
sua sponte set aside guilty plea before entry of judgment, but gave defendant a week to 
decide if he wanted to re-enter plea). 
The State found only one Utah case—an unpublished memorandum decision—in 
which a defendant sought a misplea. See State v. Schubarth, 2005 UT App 166U. Schubarth 
entered a plea in abeyance that was clearly illegal under the controlling statute. Id. at * 1. 
Because the plea was clearly illegal, the court of appeals held a misplea was appropriate. Id. 
Although the court of appeals applied the misplea doctrine in reaching its decision, 
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Schubarth was more about a plea that was void from the outset than it was about a misplea, 
where the trial court or prosecutor had violated the terms of the plea agreement. 
Nothing here, however, suggests that defendant's plea violated a statute or was void 
at its inception. Nor did the trial court or the prosecution seek to rescind the plea agreement 
over the defendant's objection. Rather, the only question raised by this Court—and seized 
upon by defendant—is whether defendant's plea might be defective for lack of a sufficient 
factual basis. That question is a classic basis for motions to withdraw a guilty plea, which 
are governed by the jurisdictional time limit in the plea withdrawal statute. See, e.g., State 
v. Bunker, 2007 UT App 290U; State v. Hale, 2006 UT App 434U; State v. Richins, 2004 UT 
App 36,1Hf 6-10, 86 P.3d 759; State v. Farabee, 2003 UT App 353U; State v. Wilson, 2002 
UT App 360U; State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1993). 
As explained in the State's opening supplemental brief, if defendant had attempted 
to raise this claim on appeal, this Court would have lacked jurisdiction to address it because 
defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his plea. See State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ffl[ 
10-14, 167P.3d 1046; Grimmettv. State, 2007 UT 11,1125, 152?.3d 306; State v. Merrill, 
2005 UT 34, ffif 13-20, 114 P.3d 585; State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3, 40 P.3d 630. That 
statutory jurisdictional time bar cannot be circumvented merely by recasting what should 
have been a motion to withdraw the plea into a request for a misplea. To hold otherwise 
would be "to invite every tardy application to withdraw a plea to be styled as [a request for 
a misplea]." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^[ 14. The misplea doctrine, therefore, cannot confer 
jurisdiction on this Court to review the validity of defendant's Alfordplez. 
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B. Exceptions to the preservation rule do not permit an appellate court to reach an 
issue over which it lacks jurisdiction. 
Defendant argues that this Court "may also choose to employ the exceptional 
circumstances and/or plain error doctrine in correcting the erroneous entry of Ott's pleas." 
Supp. Br. Aplt. 24-25. Alternatively, defendant contends that this Court "may choose to 
employ the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine to invalidate the pleas." Id. at 26. 
This Court has expressly held, however, that exceptions to the preservation rule, such 
as plain error, do not allow it to "choose" to review the validity of a guilty plea in which no 
timely motion to withdraw has been filed: "This court may choose to review an issue not 
properly preserved for plain error. It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue over 
which it has no jurisdiction." Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^ 4. This Court has also expressly held 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not confer jurisdiction on this Court to review 
an untimely motion to withdraw a plea. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^f 10-14. 
This Court may not, therefore, address the validity of defendant's guilty plea under 
an exception to the preservation rule.1 
1
 The jurisdictional requirement that a defendant move to withdraw a guilty plea 
first in the trial court rests on sound policy: the need for a factual context. When a 
defendant does not move to withdraw a guilty plea in the trial court, a factual record 
supporting or refuting a defendant's claim that his plea was not knowing or voluntary has 
not yet been developed. In that regard, the plea withdrawal statute ensures the 
opportunity of developing a full factual record before the validity of a plea receives 
appellate review. If a defendant files a timely motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court 
can hold an evidentiary hearing. If a defendant does not timely move to withdraw, he is 
then directed to file a petition for post-conviction relief where he may seek an evidentiary 
hearing on his claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c) (West 2004). 
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REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF, POINT I 
A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS EXISTS TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S PLEA THAT HE INTENTIONALLY OR 
KNOWINGLY KILLED ANOTHER 
The parties agree that the aggravated murder statute requires that defendant 
intentionally or knowingly, as opposed to accidentally, caused the death of another. See 
Supp. Br. Aplt. 15-17. The only real dispute on the merits is whether there was a sufficient 
factual basis showing that defendant faced a substantial risk of conviction for aggravated 
murder if he had gone to trial. Compare id. at 17-23 with State's Supp. Br. at 5-14. 
Defendant argues that Judge Allphin incorrectly "concluded that when someone lights 
a home on fire when he knows it is occupied, this demonstrates intent to kill the occupants, 
and that because [defendant] knew that Donna Ott was in the house at the time he lit the fire, 
it could be inferred that he intended to kill her," and that this intent to kill "transferred to the 
death of Lacey Lawrence." Supp. Br. Aplt. 20-21. Defendant does not contend that the 
doctrine of transferred intent would not apply if the record showed he intended to kill anyone 
in the house by setting fire; he argues only that the record does not support such an inference. 
Specifically, defendant argues that "setting fire in or to an occupied building does not 
necessarily encompass knowledge or intent to kill the occupants." Id. at 21 n. 17. 
Defendant ignores the record evidence showing that he did much more than set fire 
to an occupied building. After buying all the supplies necessary to commit arson, 
defendant—in the middle of the night—cut the phone lines to the house; stabbed Allen 
Lawrence and his step-daughter; doused the living room, hall, and master bedroom with 
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gasoline; and started the fire in the living room, near the front door. Rl3 81:84-89,109-16, 
121,140,149,161-63,182-83,221,232-35,256. Although Allen Lawrence and defendant's 
step-daughter had left the home by the time defendant set the fire, the record does not state 
that defendant actually knew that they had left. R1381:183-84, 193. The record shows, 
however, that defendant at least knew that his wife and another step-daughter were still in 
the home when he set the fire. R1381:116-17,143-46. He also knew that his step-children 
slept in the basement and were likely to have friends sleeping over on a holiday weekend. 
R1381:15-16,22,108,125-26,190; R1382:283. Finally, defendant knewthat his own young 
children were not in the house. R1381:21, 50-51, 107. 
Taken together, the foregoing facts support a reasonable inference that defendant 
intended to kill the occupants in the house, or at least knew that his conduct was reasonably 
certain to cause death. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (West 2004) (defining when a person 
acts knowingly or with knowledge). Defendant attacked when he knew the occupants—who 
included minors—were likely to be sleeping and thus at their most vulnerable; he cut the 
phone lines to prevent the occupants from summoning help; he set the fire so as to cut off a 
primary escape route; and he made sure that although his step-children were in harm's way, 
his own children were not. 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that there was "no evidence that [he] intended for 
Allen Lawrence or anyone to die in the fire... which he set after Allen Lawrence and Sarah 
Gooch had left the house." Supp. Br. Aplt. at 20 n. 15. As stated, however, the record does 
not expressly state that defendant knew that Allen Lawrence and Sarah had already escaped 
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from the house before he set the fire. Rl 3 81:183-84,193. Defendant le ft a badly-injured and 
bleeding Lawrence near the front door when he went to retrieve gasoline from the garage. 
See Rl 3 81:183-84,193. Clearly, Lawrence was no longer there when defendant returned to 
douse the front room with gasoline. For all defendant knew, however, Lawrence and Sarah 
may have secreted themselves somewhere inside the house. Thus, it is not at all clear that 
defendant did not intend to finish Allen Lawrence off by fire. 
Defendant further claims that the evidence did not show he intended that anyone die 
in the fire because he "told Donna to get everyone out of the house when he set the fire and 
. . . he did not stop anyone from leaving." Supp. Br. Aplt. at 20 n. 15. The only evidence that 
defendant told Donna to get everyone out of the house was a police officer's preliminary 
hearing testimony that defendant told him that he did this. Rl 3 82:283. That officer testified, 
however, that defendant also insisted that he did not remember setting the fire or stabbing 
Allen Lawrence. Id. And, in the same conversation, defendant told the officer that although 
he knew that both his step-daughters slept in the basement, he did not go down to make sure 
they were out of the house. Id. 
The existence of competing inferences do not negate the existence of a sufficient 
factual basis for purposes of an AIford plea. See State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671, 674 
(Utah App. 1993) (in determining factual basis for plea, record as whole need not be 
conclusive or uncontroverted on question of guilt; there must only be evidence from which 
trial court may reasonably find defendant guilty). While a jury might have believed 
defendant's self-serving statements that he did not intend to kill anyone by fire, it might also 
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have reasonably inferred from the foregoing facts that he did. This is the risk that defendant 
sought to avoid by entering his Alfordplea. 
Defendant suggests that his plea is nevertheless invalid because none of the "various 
disparate factual and legal theories" was "discussed or adopted during the entry of the plea." 
Supp. Br. Aplt. at 21. But as explained in the State's opening brief, whether a sufficient 
factual basis exists is determined by resort to the entire record. See Willett v. Barnes, 842 
P.2d 860, 861-63 (Utah 1992); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266,1273 (Utah 1988); Stilling, 
856 P.2d at 671, 674. When defendant's plea hearing is viewed in light of the entire 
record—including the preliminary hearing testimony—the facts and their reasonable 
inferences provide a sufficient factual basis that when defendant set fire to his house, he 
intended to cause the death of another, or at least knew that his conduct was reasonably 
certain to cause that result.2 
2Defendant seeks to cast further doubt on the validity of his plea by re-asserting 
arguments presented in his original briefs. Br. Aplt. 10-11, 22-23. As explained, 
however, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address the validity of defendant's plea, 
irrespective of the nature of the challenge. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to examine the validity of defendant's Alford plea. 
Neither the misplea doctrine nor preservation rules confer jurisdiction on this Court. Even 
if this Court had jurisdiction, defendant's Alford plea was supported by a sufficient factual 
basis. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of August, 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
B.DUPAIX 
:SSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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